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This article proposes a new methodology for estimating the impact offuel price and tax changes on the general price level and the distribution of income and applies a model to
. Because the model allows for pricing under international competition where tax increases must be partially absorbed in reduced factor income ratber than always being passed on in higher consumer prices, the results are significantly different from those generated by the more conventional cost-plus pricing rule. The 
inflationary impact of fuel tax changes is slight because of both the openness of the economy and the low energy intensity of manufacturing and other production in Thailand. In contrast, taxes on imports engender price increases not only for imports but also for goods which substitute for imports. The model also indicates that the net effects of taxes on petroleum products (other than kerosene) are progressive in their distributional impact, relative to a tax on imports or consumption. A main policy conclusion of the study is that fuel taxes could be used to increase both equity and allocative efficiency without inducing significant inflationary responses. It follows that in the current circumstances of falling world oil prices, developing countries could generate revenues needed for structural adjustment by increasing fuel taxes to maintain domestic petroleum price levels.
In many developing countries, the effective ad valorem rate of tax on petroleum products fell significantly during the 1970s (Hughes 1986b) . The reasons for this decline are many and doubtless vary from country to country, but among them is the fear that raising petroleum product prices either would have an adverse impact on the price level or would worsen the distribution of income. In contrast, many developed countries rely upon petroleum taxes as a significant source of government revenue, and it has often been suggested that gasoline and other fuel taxes are an appropriate method of financing the costs of road networks. These various policies and proposals reflect widely differing views of the inflktionary and distributional impact of fuel taxes. Hence, as part of a research project sponsored by the Transportation Department of the World Bank, I have developed a new methodology for estimating the impact of taxes on items such as fuels which are primarily used as intermediate inputs into the production of other goods and services. In this article, I outline this methodology and apply it to Thailand.
Thailand is quite typical of a large number of developing countries in that it relies primarily upon imported oil and petroleum products to meet its commercial energy requirements. Petroleum accounted for 85 to 90 percent of commercial energy demand and 65 to 70 percent of total energy demand in the late 1970s. Hydroelectricity and lignite accounted for most of the residual demand for commercial energy, while fuelwood and bagasse represent the principal noncommercial sources of energy. The population of Thailand was 46 million in 1980, and its average gross national product (GNP) per capita of $600 was very close to the median value for all developing countries. Ihe country's size and lack of domestic energy resources meant that in 1980 it was the fifth largest net importer of petroleum among the developing countries; however, it should be noted that its position may change somewhat during the late 1980s because of the development of natural gas fields in the Gulf of Thailand and also possible exploitation of large-scale lignite reserves. The proportion of the population living in urban areas is relatively low (14 percent in 1980;, though this is partly the result of a restrictive official definition of urban areas. The influence of the urban population on policy is nonetheless very important because of its concentration in the capital city, Bangkok.
If one compares the average values of the ratios of domestic to border prices for a sample of developing countries, one finds that from 1970 to 1973 Thailand levied substantially lower taxes on gasoline (with a ratio of 3.61) and diesel oil than the average, while for kerosene (with a 2.74 ratio) it was close to the average. By 1978-82 the gap had narrowed considerably so that Thailand was only slightly lower than the average for gasoline (at 2.17), while for both kerosene (1.25) and diesel oil it was slightly above the average, Inevitably, the results of the analysis presented in this article must depend upon the particular circumstances, consumer preferences, and production technologies characteristic of the country examined. Nonetheless, Thailand seems representative of a large group of oil-importing developing countries, and in summarizing my empirical findings I will attempt to highlight conclusions which are likely to be valid for such countries.
Investigation of the effect of changing taxes on petroleum products involves two separate steps. First, one needs a model to predict how the change in fuel taxes will affect producer and consumer prices of other commodities and also the impact on wage rates and factor incomes. Second, one must examine the effect of these price and income changes upon the real income and welfare levels of households. The work in both stages has to be based orn highly disaggregated data on industries and commodities if it is to reveal the differential impact of fuel taxes on different industries or various categories of household.
Despite a decade of large increases in fuel prices, there has been relatively little research into the microeconomic impact of fuel price changes on other prices and the distribution of income. For developed countries, studies by Catsambas (1982) of petroleum taxation in the United States (which supersede earlier studies by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office [1979] and by Common [1985] of the effects of higher energy prices in the United Kingdom) come closest to the approach adopted in this article. There are also some more specific studies of natural resource pricing and taxation policies which apply similar methods of analysis-for example, Archibald and Gillingham (1981) on alternative methods of conserving gasoline and YoungDay and Fight (1979) on timber pricing. For developing countries, consultants' studies of petroleum pricing in Egypt, Peru, and the Philippines have attempted to investigate the impact of energy prices in a disaggregated framework (see Pearce and Edwards 1984; Julius 1985) . All these studies, however, suffer from two limitations, which this study attempts to surmount. First, they rely upon a simplistic model of price determination which is familiar from closed economy input-output analysis. Section II outlines a more general framework for analyzing the impact of fuel taxes on producer and consumer prices which underlies the empirical work reported in section IV. Second, the earlier studies rely upon aggregate or average data for household consumption, and such data cannot reveal the extent to which the impact of tax changes differs between households. In this study, it was possible to assess the importance of such differential effects by using individual data from large-scale household budget surveys.
The analysis described below represents a compromise between complexity and simplicity and hence has certain limitations. To preserve the degree of disaggregation, it was obviously impossible to construct a full general equilibrium model of the impact of fuel taxes. The model is essentially linear and as such gives a local approximation which is accurate for relatively small tax or price changes. The reasons for using a linear model which does not attempt to solve for wages and other variables in the manner of a general equilibrium model are simplicity and the judgment that the benefits of disaggregation are more important than those of incorporating pricing feedback into the model. The question of simplicity is far from trivial because one of the objectives was to provide a practical model which could be adapted easily to assess the impact of alternative fuel price policies in other countries. The approach adopted here is very similar in spirit to that of Ahmad and Stern (1986) in their analysis of tax reform in India. Some of the tax changes which are examined here are certainly not marginal. It should therefore be remembered that the concavity of cost and expenditure functions-reflecting the fact the individual inputs or consumption goods can be substituted-ensures that the model will overestimate the impact of these changes. In some parallel work, I have introduced substitution between different fuels and energy, other material inputs, and value added in response to changes in relative prices in order to estimate changes in the volume of energy consumption (Hughes 1986c ), but this is only possible in a model with a relatively small number of sectors.
The accuracy of a linear approximation to a full general equilibrium model depends on the size of the contemplated changes in relative prices. The reforms discussed in this study involve large tax changes for some or all petroleum products. However, they have been chosen so that the scope for tax-induced substitution between fuels is limited in the short run. For instance, the amount of gasoline used as an intermediate input in the nontransport sectors is tiny and the extent of substitution of diesel for gasoline can be controlled by import duties and license fees on diesel and gasoline engine vehicles. Higher fuel prices overall will encourage firms to conserve energy, but since fuel inputs represent less than 8 percent of total intermediate inputs after netting out transactions between energy industries, one would not expect them to lead to major changes in the general structure of relative prices. This point will be reinforced later in the article, but it should be clear that the analysis of the impact of fuel taxes need not require the use of fully disaggregated cost functions.
The analysis treats the activities of petroleum refining and other aspects of energy production as if they were either entirely controlled by the government or carried out offshore. Hence, the government is assumed to have complete control over the ex-refinery price of petroleum products. Any change in fuel taxes is fully reflected in fuel prices, so there is no interesting distinction between the two when one investigates the impact of policy changes. This rules out the possibility that a part of the burden of increased fuel taxes may be borne by oil companies. Since Thailand is neither a large importer of oil in world terms nor particularly important in relation to the major refining facilities in Singapore, this assumption seems reasonable.
I. PRICE DETERMINATION
Most disaggregated models of the impact of fuel prices have assumed that changes in costs will be passed on completely as price changes. I shall refer to this pricing rule as cost-plus pricing. For marginal changes in relative prices, the rule may be justified by considering the unit cost function ci (p,w,v) for the ith output, where p is the vector of goods prices, w the vector of factor prices, v the vector of energy prices, and t is a vector of producer taxes per unit of output. Under competitive conditions, one would expect that Api = S 3c (p,w,) Apj + E ac, (p,v) 
since the input requirement for intermediate good j per unit output of i, aij is aci (p,w,v) /apj and the corresponding input requirements for factor k and fuel f are defined similarly.' This formulation can be generalized by introducing substitution between factors and other inputs or by assuming that specific coefficients respond to price changes-for example, the energy conservation equation (39) in Pearce and Edwards (1984) . However, even when more general specifications are used, the equations rest upon the fundamental assumption that changes in prices are linked to changes in the cost of production. While the cost-plus pricing rule may be appropriate for many nontraded goods and services, it is not plausible for the considerable number of agricultural and industrial commodities with prices that are-in various ways-linked to the level of world prices or are effectively controlled by the government. For example, in Thailand the cost of production of paddy is not the dominant factor in determining the domestic price of rice. One can argue whether its price is directly controlled by the government or is determined by the export price less various export duties directly under government control. The distinction between the two formulations is unimportant in this case; what is important is the fact that exogenous influences may be the crucial determinant of domestic prices.
The other pricing rules may all be regarded as special cases of a general pricing equation linking the producer price of good i to some price p--which may be exogenously determined. The general equation is:
The coefficients aij, ,ik, and -yif are included in the equation for two reasons. First, the prices pi and pi'may refer to items which are similar but are priced on different bases so that, for example, one must allow for differences between the transport, distribution, or packaging costs for export and domestic sales.
Second, the prices pi and pj'may refer to different items with prices closely linked by market competition through substitution or complementarity in production or consumption. It is also assumed that there are cost-plus activities which determine the relationship between the two prices. The examples of the links between the prices of cassava and tapioca meal and of powder and liquid milk given below illustrate the types of pricing behavior that may be represented by this equation. In these cases, the aij and other coefficients include processing or other manufacturing costs as well as transport and distribution margins.
Two simple applications of this general pricing equation yield:
* The traded-goods pricing rule: for a traded or trade-competing good, the price of i may be directly linked to the price of competing traded goods, so that, in equation 2, where Pi denotes the government-controlled price for sector i for price-controlled goods, or for commodities for which key inputs or substitutes are pricecontrolled. Tapioca and milk powder serve to illustrate the variety of cases which can be covered by these two pricing rules. Thailand is a major exporter of tapioca meal, which is produced by milling cassava. The demand for cassava by the tapiocamilling sector determines the farm-gate price of cassava. Tapioca milling is reasonably treated as a cost-plus activity, so cassava will be treated as a traded good as well as tapioca. Similar considerations apply to rice and paddy.
Similarly, suppose that a country imports milk powder for reconstituted liquid milk that is sold in competition with domestic milk. Again, assuming that this reconstitution is a cost-plus activity, competition will fix the producer price of domestic milk by reference to the cost of imported milk powder. In each case, one could replace the border prices by a government-controlled price without altering the remainder of the pricing equations.
The final pricing category consists of nontraded goods with prices determined by competitive market forces. These goods compete with traded and controlledprice agricultural goods for land and other scarce agricultural resources on the production side, while on the demand side they are substitutes for the same or other commodities in household consumption. Hence, the prices of these "market-clearing nontraded goods" will be linked to the prices of other traded and controlled price items. 2 The complete set of pricing equations may be expressed as a single matrix equation: where H2 = [1I-Gc-l G2, and so forth. The G matrixes are obtained by applying the cost-plus pricing equation to all sectors. Thus, the rows of Gi and GQ will be identical in the case of sectors for which cost-plus pricing is assumed to apply in the general pricing model, but otherwise they will differ.
Up to this point, it has not been important to distinguish between producer or purchaser prices. For reasons of data availability and manipulation, it is more convenient to let Api refer to the change in the producer price (ex-factory or exfarm) of good i. Consequently, a further set of equations is needed to express consumer prices in terms of producer prices. For good i, the change in the consumer price, r,, is given by:
The parameter o, reflects the degree of competitiveness or complementarity between domestic and imported goods for sector i in final consumption, while r, is the sales tax on the sector. The marketing cost term, djAp,, represents the change in the cost of good or servicej involved in getting good i from the producer to the consumer. I have assumed that these costs are identical for traded and domestic goods, but the model can easily incorporate changes in this assumption. The pricing rules imply that in the sectors for which cost-plus pricing is not assumed there must be some changes in factor incomes if the vectors of price changes and changes in unit costs of production differ. Suppose that in each sector there are certain immobile factors of production and that all pure profits and similar factor payments 7ri can be attributed to these factors. Thus, the change in profits will be (10) Aij = Api -Aci where Aci is the change in the unit cost of production; that is,
In the long run, one would expect a sector to cease production if it is consistently unprofitable. This implies that a sector which persistently makes financial losses will continue to operate only if these are offset by some form of government subsidy so that ti < 0 and 7 i = 0. In recognition of the general equilibrium character of the problem to be studied, it would be desirable to incorporate some feedback from prices to wages and other factor payments. Changes in fuel prices will affect output prices and hence the demand for labor and for other factors of production as well as the replacement cost of the capital stock in each sector. The model could be extended to include these feedbacks by adding equations of the general form (12) A(Bw) =f (Ap) However, the problems of specifying and estimating such a relationship are formidable. Instead, I will discuss later the consequences of making alternative assumptions about the link between Ap and Aw.
II. THE PRICING MODEL FOR THAILAND
The basic data for the application of the model are contained in the 1975 and 1982 Thai input-output tables at producer prices (NESDB 1980; Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute 1985) . Both sources present information for interindustry transactions for 180 sectors and include data on imported intermediate inputs, trade, and transport margins. The 1982 table was supplemented by further disaggregation of the energy sectors which gave data on the utilization of specific fuels. It was impractical to work with the full set of disaggregated sectors, so these were combined to give a 73-sector breakdown.
All petroleum products were covered by one of the 73 sectors-petroleum refining. After investigation of Thai energy data for 1975, five fuel categories were identified for the analysis of fuel inputs-that is, the gif coefficients in equation 1. These were: (i) gasoline and aviation fuel, (ii) kerosene, (iii) diesel oil and gas oil, (iv) heavy fuel oil, (v) liquified petroleum gas (LPG), and miscellaneous petroleum products. The discussion will focus upon the impact of changes in petroleum product prices or taxes on the general level of prices and on income distribution in Thailand. The results of a larger model, including ten separate fuels based on 1982 data (Hughes 1986c) , will occasionally be referred to here in order to indicate the robustness of conclusions drawn from the two models discussed.
Data on the composition of petroleum products used in different sectors were available for 1982. For 1975, however, the disaggregation of petroleum product inputs involved the compilation of data from a variety of sources supplemented by data from other countries. It was also necessary to split transport margins on final sales between the three modes of transport-railways, coastal and inland water, and road freight. Transport margins on intermediate transactions had already been disaggregated in the preparation of the input-output tables at producer prices. A constrained least-squares procedure combined with a limited amount of external information on transport patterns vvas used to perform this disaggregation.
The most important step in the construction of the pricing models was the allocation of sectors to the various pricing rules. After some investigation, I decided not to treat any sectors as being subject to government price controlsexcept, of course, for petroleum products, which are treated separately. This decision might be disputed for certain cases-for example, electricity (for which cost-plus pricing was assumed), rice, and cassava (whose prices were assumed to be determined ultimately by net export prices). In these cases, the assumption is that the government would, as in the past, prefer to influence prices via the manipulation of trade taxes and/or specific taxes and subsidies. The overall distribution of sectors, output, and demand between the remaining three pricing rules is shown in table 1. The cost-plus rule applies to a majority of sectors, while the twenty-six sectors covered by the traded goods pricing rule are predominantly agricultural or natural-resource-based. Because of the importance of services in total consumption expenditures, sectors subject to cost-plus pricing are more important in fulfilling final demand than in meeting the input needs of other sectors. It follows, therefore, that abandoning the cost-plus pricing assumption for all sectors will influence sectoral cost structures as well as the prices charged to final consumers. Details of the sectors covered by the traded and market nontraded pricing rules are given in appendix A (a complete, numbered list of all sectors is given in appendix B). The relevant coefficients for most of the sectors not subject to cost-plus pricing could be estimated quite straightforwardly from input-output and other data. However, two pairs of nontraded sectors presented particular difficulties, which deserve a brief discussion: * Sectors 4 through 6 are agricultural products which compete with ultimately traded goods such as paddy, cassava, fibers, and tobacco for production resources and with some of these in consumption. In the absence of direct information on the relative magnitudes of their own-price and crossprice elasticities, these parameters were derived from evidence on the rice market. Wong (1978) estimated price elasticities for rice using composite indexes of competing crop prices to obtain the cross-price elasticities. For both long-and short-run estimates, the sum of the cross-price elasticities was approximately half the sum of own-price elasticities. I have assumed that a similar relationship will hold for the two sectors under consideration and that the magnitude of the response to the individual competing products is determined by the share of each item in total production in that sector.
74 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 1, NO. 1 * Sector 17-charcoal and firewood-covers items with price behavior that is difficult to model satisfactorily and even more difficult to quantify empirically. The complications arise because this sector competes, to a limited extent, in production with logging and wood manufacturing for scarce timber resources and in consumption with kerosene, especially in rural areas. In the absence of proper information about substitution in supply and demand, I have been obliged to make the somewhat arbitrary assumption that it is substitution in consumption which dominates, so that the consumer price of charcoal and firewood is linked to that of kerosene with an elasticity of 0.5.
III. THE IMPACT OF FUEL TAXES ON PRICES
The model can be used to investigate various types of tax changes. The taxes discussed in this article have been chosen to illustrate various aspects of the impact of fuel taxes in Thailand.
First, there are three general taxes designed to collect a fixed amount of government revenue in different ways:
Rl. A uniform ad valorem sales tax on all petroleum products R2. An import sales tax on the landed price (including existing customs duties) of all imported goods R3. An export duty on the FOB value of all exports.
These are of interest if the government needs to reduce its budget deficit by some predetermined percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in order to achieve macroeconomic or structural adjustment. Alternatively, they allow us to examine the effects of a revenue-neutral tax reform under which some taxes are increased and others reduced. Similarly, if it is assumed that prices are independent of the composition of aggregate demand, this approach can be used to investigate the effects of a switch from private to public expenditure via a balanced budget increase in indirect taxes and government expenditure, such as for road building.
The tax rates for the general taxes have been calculated on the basis of collecting net revenue-after allowing for the higher cost of government purchases-amounting to 1 percent of total final demand, on the assumption that the aggregate consumption of all products remains unchanged. 3 The two trade taxes have been chosen for the comparison because many countries facing a balance of trade deficit choose to increase import duties. In Thailand, export duties-especially the rice premium-have also been a major source of revenue in the past. Another consideration is that an import sales tax combined with a matching export subsidy is equivalent to a real devaluation of the same amount, though the former option will not be strictly revenue-neutral if the trade balance is not zero. Thus the model allows comparison of the impact of fuel taxes, of a devaluation, and of trade taxes, all as means of structural adjustment. The second category of taxes consists of excise duties imposed upon specific fuels:
R4. An excise tax on motor gasoline and aviation fuel R5. An excise tax on kerosene R6. An excise tax on diesel oil and gas oil.
Again to facilitate comparisons, the tax rates will be computed on the basis of raising a predetermined amount of government revenue, so that it is possible to examine the consequences of, for example, introducing cross-subsidies in setting fuel prices by raising the price of one fuel and using the extra revenue to lower the price of another fuel.
The tax rates for the specific fuel excise duties have been calculated on the basis of collecting net revenue-as defined above-equal to 0.25 percent of total final demand. As will be shown, this procedure implies very large tax rates in the case of kerosene, so that the assumption of unchanged demand is hardly plausible. It would have been possible to have set a lower net revenue target-say, 0.1 percent of total final demand-but the effects of some of the resulting taxes are so small as to be within the margins of error in the data. Hence, the figures are reported in order to indicate the direction and relative magnitudes of the impact of specific fuel taxes, but they should not be interpreted as forecasts of the actual impact of the larger tax changes, because substitution will ensure that the model will overestimate their impact during any period other than the very short run.
In order to judge the magnitudes of the fuel taxes required to raise the fixed amount of revenue in each year, it is useful to note the structure of petroleum product prices in Thailand in 1975 and 1982 by comparison with CIF border prices. These are shown in table 2; the indexes in the table refer to indexes of the relative price of each product, with regular gasoline = 100. The ratio of the domestic purchaser price to the border price for a fuel gives a broad indication of the extent to which the fuel is taxed or subsidized. It should be remembered, however, that transport and distribution margins would imply ratios of between 1.05 and 1.15 for different products even in the absence of any taxes or subsidies. It is very difficult to establish a border price for heavy fuel oil, so this item will be omitted from the discussion of implicit taxes and subsidies.
The figures show that in 1975 all the products were taxed with the usual pattern of heavier taxes on gasoline than other fuels. By 1982 the pattern had changed; there had been a considerable increase in the taxes imposed on gasoline, whereas the tax on motor diesel oil had been reduced and those on kerosene and industrial diesel oil had been converted into substantial subsidies. For politi-76 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 1, NO. 1 cal and economic reasons following the second oil price shock of 1979-80, the Thai government was reluctant to allow a rapid increase in the prices of fuels other than gasoline. Hence, gasoline-especially premium gasoline-was made to bear a disproportionate share of the price increases, while taxes on kerosene and industrial diesel oil were converted into subsidies and the tax on motor diesel oil was virtually eliminated.
The tax rates on petroleum products were calculated with reference to the producer (ex-refinery) prices of petroleum according to the amount required to raise the predetermined amounts of net revenue under the various reforms. It is therefore not very instructive to discuss the tax rates themselves, so instead table 3 shows the percentage changes in purchaser prices resulting from the imposition of these taxes. 4 The reduction between 1975 and 1982 in the size of the fuel price rises necessary to generate the given revenue for petroleum products and individual fuels reflects the general increase in the prices of petroleum products relative to other items during this period. Furthermore, in the case of kerosene, the switch in pricing policy together with other factors had the effect of encouraging consumption to grow at 9 percent per year in volume from 1975 to 1982, whereas the total consumption of petroleum products grevw only 3.1 percent per year. Hence, the price rise associated with the kerosene excise fell from 175 percent in 1975 to 76 percent in 1982.
In either year, the kerosene excise would have led to a very large shift in the price of kerosene relative to other fuels, so that the caveat that the model overestimates the impact of the taxes on prices and real incomes is particularly important in this case. Such price rises for a single fuel would prompt quite rapid substitution away from kerosene in favor of diesel oil among producers and in favor of LPG, electricity, charcoal, and firewood among consumers. Thus, it is clear that the kerosene excise would fall well short of its revenue target while calculations based on the assumption that no substitution will occur will significantly overstate the magnitude of its impact. It is more difficult to assess whether the qualitative character of conclusions based upon this model would be affected by substitution because much depends upon the alternative fuels available-that is, who among those worst affected by the kerosene price rise has access to local sources of charcoal, firewood, electricity, or bottled gas. The import sales tax required to collect net revenue equal to 1 percent of total final demand is virtually the same in both years, but the export sales tax fell quite substantially. This is because in 1975 the value of merchandise imports was equal to 1.31 times the value of merchandise exports, whereas this ratio had fallen to 1.11 by 1982. Because petroleum-related products constituted such a large share of total imports (31 percent by 1982), crude oil and petroleum products have been excluded from the tax base of the import sales tax in order to distinguish analytically between the impact of fuel taxes and the import sales tax. In addition, services have been excluded from the tax base because of the difficulty of taxing imports of services. Thus in 1982 a higher tax on imports than on exports is required to generate the same revenue.
The percentage changes in producer and consumer indexes associated with the tax reforms are shown for both the general pricing model and the cost-plus pricing model in table 4, while appendix B lists the percentage changes in the producer prices under the general pricing model for the individual sectors. Note that the changes in the overall price index are scaled by the requirement that the general tax reforms collect net revenue equivalent to 1 percent of total final demand and that the excise taxes collect 0.25 percent of demand. Since private consumption was 53 percent of total demand in 1982, it would require a 1.88 percent tax on consumption (and thus an equal increase in consumer prices) to Tax reform 1975 Tax reform 1982 Tax reform 1975 Tax reform 1982 Tax reform 1975 Tax reform 1982 Tax reform 1975 Tax reform 1982 General taxesa Rl. Consumer price changes significantly below 1 percent for the general taxes, or 0.25 percent for fuel excises indicate that the pricing system has the effect of shifting the tax burdens backward onto factor incomes either directly, by affecting the profitability of various activities, or indirectly, by increasing the relative cost of investment. This means, of course, that the effects of any tax increase go substantially beyond the direct impact on prices and real incomes, though it should be remembered that both government expenditure and a part of gross investment are protected by the assumption that the taxes collect equal net, rather than gross, revenue. According to the general pricing model, the taxes on all petroleum products and on imports have a fairly similar impact on the indexes of both consumer and producer prices. This is in complete contrast to the results of the cost-plus pricing model, which suggests that the tax on all petroleum products would have a much greater impact on the general price level than the import sales tax. The differences arise because the general model assumes that producers of importcompeting goods will increase their prices in line with the price of the imports with which they compete, whereas the cost-plus model is based on the assumption that higher prices for imported goods will only affect the price indexes via the cost of imported inputs into domestic production or via direct consumption of imported goods. For the tax on petroleum producits, the cost-plus model assumes that producers can pass on the higher cost of fuel inputs into produc-tion, whereas the general model does not allow this in the case of sectors producing exported or import-competing goods. The difference between the two models is even more marked in the case of the export tax, which has a negligible impact on domestic prices in the cost-plus model but which implies a substantial fall in both producer and consumer price indexes in the general model.
The results illustrate the importance of distinguishing between cost-plus pricing and a framework in which many prices are determined by exogenous factors. As a rule, the contrast between the two models is more substantial for the change in the producer price index than for the change in the consumer price index. This is because nontraded items, for which cost-plus pricing applies in both cases, have a considerably greater weight in consumption than in output. A further implication of the difference between the two models is that the income and other effects associated with the taxes are significantly different under the alternative sets of assumptions. By definition, cost-plus pricing implies that profits and self-employment income are not directly affected by the taxes. The lower increase in the producer price index under the general pricing model than with cost-plus pricing implies that the tax on all petroleum products is likely to cause a net reduction in such income. This outcome is not certain because some sectors will gain, relative to the cost-plus framework, from smaller cost increases so that there will be a fairly mixed pattern of gains as well as losses among the various non-cost-plus sectors. For the trade taxes, the patterns of gains and losses are simpler since they will correspond to the consequences of imposing tariff or export duties. The figures show that the export tax falls heavily on factor incomes in sectors producing exported goods.
Examination of the changes in producer prices by sector (see appendix B) reveals that the tax on all petroleum products penalizes energy-intensive sectors which produce traded goods-for example, mining, iron and steel, transport equipment, and industrial chemicals.' The prices of other energy-intensive nontraded activities, such as cement, rise substantially, but their profits are protected because they are assumed to be cost-plus sectors. For the import tax, the main losers are nonferrous metals and milling of maize and grain-both exporting sectors with significant imported intermediate inputs-while the principal beneficiaries are import-competing manufacturing sectors-especially transport equipment, machinery, and chemicals-and domestic producers of vegetable oil. The major price reductions associated with the export tax affect exportable primary products-rice and paddy, tapioca, sugar, fish, and nonferrous metals. Producers in all these sectors would be hard hit by the tax, while sectors which use exportables as intermediate inputs in producing import-competing goodsfor example, vegetable oils and some chemicals-would benefit from the tax.
Among the price increases associated with the specific fuel taxes, it is the impact of the kerosene excise on consumer prices which stands out. This is twice
5.
Tables showing the impact of fuel taxes on profits and self-employment income are available from the author.
THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 1, NO. 1 as large as would be generated by a value-added tax on private consumption yielding similar revenue. This is because the kerosene tax results in a large increase in the producer price of charcoal and firewood via the market-clearing pricing rule discussed in the previous section. As might be expected, the taxes on gasoline and especially on diesel oil are primarily reflected in the prices of energy-and transport-intensive sectors. Note also that both these taxes reduce the producer prices of exportable primary products-for example, paddy, cassava, and sugar. This is because the taxes increase the cost of processing these products and of transporting them from the farm gate to processors and then to the port. Since both transport and processing activities are assumed to be cost-plus and export prices are fixed, any increase in these costs must reduce the price paid to farmers. The same effect, of course, results from the general tax on all petroleum products.
The general implication of these results is that if the T'hai government wishes to raise fuel prices on efficiency grounds, it could fully offset the overall impact on the price level while still gaining additional public revenue by lowering the general level of import tariffs. Alternatively, if the government needs to raise additional revenue, then a general tax on petroleum products may be less inflationary than some plausible alternative sources of revenue such as an import tax, a value-added tax, or an industrial sales tax.
The other conclusion is that in developing countries similar to Thailand, fuel taxes have a very modest effect on the general level of prices and on relative prices. In part, this results from the low energy intensity of the Thai economy, though the fuel tax rates required to collect 1 percent of GDP in tax revenue are simply the reciprocal of the degree of energy intensity. The main reason is the extent to which fuel taxes can be passed on rather than being absorbed by factor incomes. Thailand has a relatively open economy with a high proportion of domestic production competing with traded goods. This competition limits the impact of fuel taxes on the general price level; these taxes tend to reduce factor incomes and only slightly increase consumer prices. Conversely, the taxes which alter trade prices (R2 and R3) have a much stronger effect under the general price model. The import sales tax has an effect similar to an import tariff. All sectors which compete with the traded goods are able to raise their prices in response to increased costs, and this rise will feed through the prices of all substitute and complementary goods-both inputs and outputs. An export tax would lower prices for exportables sold domestically, for nontraded substitutes, and for factor incomes in export production. It is this much more complex interaction between traded, nontraded, and factor market pricing which is captured in the general pricing model.
IV. FUEL TAXES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF REAL INCOME
The changes in consumer prices associated with various tax reforms will affect the distribution of real income between households. If the consumption vector of Hughes 81 household h is xh and consumer prices are r, as above, then total household expenditure is eb = rxh, and tax changes will be reflected in eh through induced changes in prices. In cash terms, the proportional change in real income, which I will refer to as the expenditure transfer, is:
where skis the budget share of good i for household h at the initial point. I will concentrate on this measure of the effect of the tax reforms, since it is directly relevant to individuals and can also be used to compute indexes of the effects of the reforms on aggregate inequality. The expenditure transfers were calculated for households included in the 1976 and 1981 Socio-Economic Surveys using price changes computed from the pricing models for 1975 and 1982 respectively. Each of the expenditure items in the surveys was reclassified to match the sectors distinguished in the pricing models. 6 The surveys recorded, separately, items purchased in the market, items received as pay in kind, and items consumed out of the household's own production.
The estimates of the expenditure transfers are based only on items purchased in the market for consumption. Price changes for goods which are received as pay in kind or consumed out of domestic production will have an effect on the cost of a given consumption basket which is exactly offset by the corresponding change in inputed income. The expenditure transfers associated with each tax reform were calculated for all the households for which complete data on expenditure patterns were available-a sample of 11,300 households for 1975-76 and one of 11,897 households for 1981-82.
Before examining the magnitude of the expenditure transfers associated with the tax reforms, it is worth comparing the patterns of direct household expenditure on petroleum products as recorded in the Socio-Economic Surveys. The average percentages of total household expenditure spent on various petroleum products by urban and rural 7 households are shown in table 5 together with their standard deviations. The figures show large differences between expenditure patterns for urban and rural households. Liquified petroleum gas is purchased by urban households but hardly at all by rural households, whereas this pattern is reversed for kerosene. Gasoline is much more important to urban households than to rural ones, though the relative share of gasoline in total expenditures on petroleum products increased between 1976 and 1981 for both 6. The mapping of expenditure categories to sectors in the pricing model proceeded by linking the items identified in the budget survey with the detailed list of products compiled in preparing the 180-sector input-output table. These were then associated with the final sectors by applying the sectoral conversion used to obtain the sectors in the pricing model from the full input-output table.
7. In this study, "rural" covers households living in villages and sanitary districts, while "urban" refers to households living in municipal areas. The assignment of sanitary districts to the rural category is questionable, but the definition has been adopted for consistency with previous studies. groups. The coefficients of variation for expenditures on gasoline as a share of total expenditures are high, and more detailed ana]lysis shows that gasoline consumption is concentrated among households with high shares of expenditures on petroleum products relative to total expenditures. The medians of the household expenditure transfers-that is, Aeh/eh expressed as a percentage of original expenditure-for the three general tax reforms and the three specific fuel excises are shown in table 6. As discussed earlier, because the three general tax reforms all generate equal revenue, this provides a scaling which helps in interpreting the expenditure transfers, both in comparing these taxes, and in comparison with the rates of a strictly proportional tax on private consumption which would raise the same amount of revenue. In addition to the median expenditure transfers, the table also gives the range between the tenth and the ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of expenditure transfers across households as a simple measure of the dispersion of the effects of the tax reforms on different households.
All the general tax reforms generate median expenditure transfers much lower than would be associated with a general tax on consumption. The export sales tax stands out because it generates a negative expenditure transfer for almost all households, which, as indicated by the changes in the consumer price index, implies that on the expenditure side households experience a real income gain as a result of the export sales tax. (The impact on factor income, however, is to create a positive [that is, adverse] average net transfer; see section V below.) The absolute magnitudes of the median transfers for different groups associated with the export tax are large, as are the ranges between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles. These observations mean that the export tax may lead to a redistrib- ution of real income between households with different characteristics or expenditure patterns. The median expenditure transfers for the tax on all petroleum products fell between 1975-76 and 1981-82, despite the increase in the average share of household expenditures devoted to petroleum products. In part, this may reflect a change in the distribution of consumption of petroleum products, but more importantly it indicates a reduction in the proportion of petroleum products consumed, directly or indirectly, by households. While the sizes of the median expenditure transfers have declined, the ranges between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles have not fallen commensurately, so that the dispersion of the expenditure transfers is larger for 1981-82 than for 1975-76. As one would expect, because of higher incomes and easier access to supplies of all fuels, urban households have significantly higher median expenditure transfers for the tax on petroleum products than do rural households. The import sales tax does not discriminate between urban and rural households as do the other two general taxes, but by 1981-82 it caused the largest median expenditure transfer for the whole population.
Among the specific fuel excises, it is the tax on kerosene which stands out as generating a median transfer for all households which is higher than that for an equal revenue consumption tax. As the figures in the previous table would lead one to expect, the kerosene tax also affects rural households much more severely than urban households. Conversely, the tax on gasoline falls more heavily on urban than on rural households. The median expenditure transfers for the kerosene tax in 1975-76 are several times the figure of 0.42 percent that would be associated with a uniform consumption tax raising equivalent revenue. This, combined with the large ranges between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, suggests that the tax falls particularly heavily on poor households, since otherwise it would collect much more revenue than a uniform consumption tax. The median expenditure transfers for the kerosene excise are much lower for 1981-82 than for 1975-76, as are the ranges; therefore, one might expect it to have a smaller impact upon rural and poor households in the later period.
It is, however, inadvisable to attempt to draw too many conclusions concerning the distributional impact of the taxes from these figures since it has been shown that there is large variation within income groups and sectors as well as between them. It is possible to calculate a measure rellecting the desirability of either imposing taxes or providing subsidies on different commodities by using data on the consumption of different products by households at various points in the income distribution. This measure is called the distributional characteristic of a commodity (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p. 431) . In a separate study (Hughes 1986a) , distributional characteristics for a wide range of commodities in Thailand have been calculated. The results of that analysis show that electricity, liquified petroleum gas, and gasoline would be prime candidates for progressive consumption taxes. Indeed, with the exception of motor vehicles and spare parts, these fuels have worse distributional characteristics than other classic luxury goods such as electrical goods, drink, and tobacco. Kerosene, charcoal, and firewood all have high distributional characteristics, which indicate that they are consumed by the relatively poor and may be candidates for subsidies. These conclusions are essentially independent of the value placed on the alleviation of inequity.
As a first step in the analysis of the distributional implications of the alternative tax reforms, table 7 gives the average expenditure transfer for all households and an index of progressivity which will be discussed below. The average expenditure transfers in the table were calculated by averaging the expenditure transfers for each household without weights; they are not the same as the expenditure-weighted average transfers, which are derived by dividing the total tax cost for each reform by total expenditures. 8 As one might expect, the fuel taxes have a rather skewed impact, so the means of the distributions exceed the medians by substantial amounts (comparing values for tables 6 and 7). The skewness is particularly marked for the gasoline tax, which implies that this tax affects small numbers of households rather heavily though its impact on most households is small. The differences between the means and medians for the import sales tax are slight, which indicates that the distributions of its expenditure transfers are much more symmetrical than are those of the fuel taxes. Skewness of the distribution of expenditure transfers across households is not per se a disadvantage since, for example, both highly progressive and highly regressive taxes may display substantial degrees of positive skewness. One problem is that a tax which is roughly proportional across households overall but which displays considerable skewness may generate considerable opposition because a small number of households gain or lose disproportionately by comparison with apparently similar households. This raises the issue of the horizontal equity or inequity of any tax reform, which will be discussed below. First, the extent to which the incidence of the taxes is progressive or regressive must be examined. This may be done in a number of ways, and the main conclusions are independent of the measure of progressivity adopted.
In table 7 , I have adopted a relative approach: first, the expenditure transfer (expressed as a percentage of original expenditures) was regressed upon total household expenditure and household size; second, the regression coefficient for 86 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW,VOL.1, where N is total household size. IP, the index of tax progressivity, is then defined as
where e is the average value of eh. This index may be thought of as the predicted difference between the proportional expenditure transfers for households of a fixed family size with expenditures equal to 0.5 times the average household expenditures and 1.5 times such an average. In this formn, any tax change that results in a large expenditure transfer from the poorest households creates a high negative total household expenditure coefficient, pt, while progressive taxes generate high positive coefficients. The index is expressed as a percentage of original household expenditures. The values of the progressivity indexes in the table should be interpreted with caution. Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the regressions estimated in order to compute the indexes is that the R 2 values are exceedingly low (less than 0.15), even by comparison with other cross-section studies. The regression coefficient yA had substantial t values (more than 10 in most equations) because of the very large sample sizes, but the relationships between the expenditure transfers and total households expenditure are very noisy. Bearing this warning in mind, one sees that the tax on gasolirne is consistently among the most progressive of the specific fuel taxes while tlhe tax on kerosene is consistently regressive. The reduction in the absolute values of the progressivity indexes between 1975-76 and 1981-82 mirrors the fall in the average expenditure transfer in most cases (as discussed above), so that the relative difference between the tax burdens on households with 0.5 and 1.5 times average households is similar in the two periods. Despite the highly regressive impact of the kerosene excise, the general tax on petroleum products is more progressive than either the import or the export sales taxes when all households are considered. Among urban households, the export sales tax has the most progressive impact; among rural households, the import sales tax is the most progressive. While indexes of progressivity indicate the nature of the correlations between the expenditure transfers and total expenditure, they do not show how important these correlations may be in affecting overall inequality and social welfare. For this purpose, table 8 shows estimates of the welfare impact of the tax reforms. 9 Regardless of the degree of inequality aversion, the change in social welfare in this measure depends upon the proportional change in average household expenditure, that is, the amount of tax collected from households, and the resulting proportional change in inequality. The index of welfare change in table 8 focuses specifically on the impact of the tax reforms on vertical inequality, with negative values indicating regressive taxation and positive values generated by progressive taxes. The table also shows the effect on inequality of a uniform lump sum subsidy per household member to all households. This subsidy distributes the same amount of revenue as is raised by the two sets of taxes-that is, amounting in total to 1 and 0.25 percent of total final demand.
There are considerable price differences between urban and rural areas in Thailand and also between the various provinces (see Meesook 1974) . In evaluating the effect of various tax changes on inequality, I was primarily interested in the distribution of real income, so that the household expenditure figures used in 9. The measure is based upon Atkinson's index of inequality (Atkinson 1970) . This is associated with the following social welfare function: 1 h 1-and the inequality index is defined by:
where e indicates the degree of inequality-aversion and H is the total number of households sampled. Thus the impact of a tax reform on social welfare can be expressed as:
-I(e)
The formulas for e = 1 differ slightly because W(1) = z log e 5 but for all e values, an increase in I(e) denotes an increase in inequality.
computing the inequality indexes were deflated by Meesook's regional price indexes. The values of the price indexes were normalized so that the overall weighted average for Thailand was equal to 1.0. In the remainder of this article, the deflated value of total household expenditures will be referred to as real household expenditures. The inequality indexes were calculated using expenditure per member of the household, so they allow for variations in household size, but the values of the indexes remain as measures of the inequality of the distribution across households. The results in table 8 show that by 1981-82 among the general taxes, the export sales tax has the strongest welfare benefit, presumably because the real income gains resulting from the decline in the prices of rice and other foodstuffs are of particular benefit to poor households; but the differences between the impact of the three general taxes are slight. By comparison with the effect of a lump sum transfer disposing of the same revenue, the distributional impacts of all three taxes are small, though all of them marginally reduce the degree of inequality of the distribution of real expenditures across households. Overall, one could not put a convincing case either for or against the use of any of these general taxes on distributional grounds.
The analysis of the welfare effect of the specific fuel taxes reinforces previous conclusions about the adverse distributional impact of taxing kerosene. However, it is important to keep this effect in perspective; the beneficial impact of the lump sum transfer in 1981-82 is nearly twice the size of the adverse impact of the kerosene tax. In other words, it would only be necessary to distribute approximately half the revenue of the kerosene tax in the form of a uniform lump sum transfer to households to offset the overall impact of the kerosene tax. This would, of course, not amount to full compensation for many households; but equally, I have not attempted to allow for substitution in consumption as a result of the effect of the taxes on relative prices.
The striking difference between the welfare changes for the kerosene excise for 1975-76 and 1981-82 reflects the effects of the government policy of limiting domestic kerosene price increases in the face of rising world oil prices. As has been shown, kerosene consumption rose rapidly between 1975 and 1982, so that a much lower tax rate is required in the later period to collect equivalent revenue. If the increase in the consumption of kerosene had come from households, this would not explain the decline in the absolute value of the welfare change resulting from the kerosene tax. It follows that the major part of the extra demand for kerosene must have come from agricultural, commercial, and industrial users, who may or may not have been able to pass on the kerosene tax in the form of higher prices for their goods or services. On the expenditure side, the figures show that the expansion in the nonhousehold demand for kerosene has substantially reduced the regressive impact of a kerosene tax and there is no reason to believe that this conclusion would be modified by taking account of the associated income changes. Hence, the provision of a subsidy for kerosene seems to have induced changes in fuel consumption patterns which largely undermine the original basis for the subsidy.
In contrast to the tax on kerosene, the gasoline excise tax generates a positive, though small, improvement in the distribution of income. Taking account of the different amounts of revenue raised by the general taxes and the fuel excises, the gasoline tax is clearly the best of the tax reforms examined in terms of its impact on vertical inequality. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that fuel taxes and other indirect taxes-including some which have not been discussed in this articleare unlikely to be suitable policy tools when a reduction in vertical inequality is an important objective.
While the effect of fuel taxes on aggregate inequality may be small in most cases, they do generate substantial horizontal inequity because of their differential impact on households with similar levels of expenditures per capita but different expenditure patterns. Economists disagree over whether the horizontal effects of a tax reform should be taken into account when assessing its merits. In political terms, however, large differences between the expenditure transfers experienced by apparently similar households may undermine support for a reform and provide the leverage sought by pressure groups who wish to subvert the objectives of the reform. Hence, policymakers must be concerned about the horizontal inequity associated with alternative tax proposals. There are a variety of ways of measuring the effects of a tax reform on horizontal equity. One approach, discussed by King (1983) , is to compute indexes of horizontal inequality (similar to the Atkinson indexes of vertical inequality used in table 8). In effect, these measure the extent to which the ranking of households in the overall distribution has been shuffled by the tax reform. King shows that the indexes of vertical and horizontal inequality can be combined to give an overall index reflecting the net effect of a reform, whose value for a rank-preserving reform will simply be equal to the Atkinson index. I have computed this overall inequality index for each of the reforms using various values of the horizontal and vertical inequality-aversion parameters. The general conclusion is that an improvement in the overall index of inequality requires either a low degree of sensitivity to horizontal inequality or a high degree of sensitivity to vertical inequality, or both, and even in these cases the gain is very small. For most plausible combinations of the two parameters, the horizontal inequity outweighs any improvement in vertical inequality.
Another more concrete method of measuring horizontal inequity relies on examining the residuals of a regression equation with the expenditure transfer as the dependent variable and total household expenditures as the independent variable. Suppose that one estimates the simple linear equation: One can then analyze the distribution of the zh across hiouseholds. This generates a measure of the extent to which individual households at a given level of expenditure differ in the change in expenditure induced by the various taxes. In table 9, the index of horizontal inequity is computed as the difference between the tenth and the ninetieth percentiles of this distribution. This means that equation 16 has been shifted upward so that 10 percent of households lie above the line, and similarly, that it has been shifted downward so that 10 percent of households lie beneath it; see figure 1 . The index is thus equal to the vertical distance between these two lines and is measured as a percentage of original household expenditures.
The figures in the table show that the horizontal inequity associated with the tax on kerosene is high by comparison with the other specific fuel taxes. In general, the degree of horizontal inequity associated with all the fuel taxes is higher for urban households than for rural households, though-as so oftenkerosene is the exception. Among the general taxes, it is the export sales tax which generates the most horizontal inequity. After scaling for the difference in the amount of revenue collected, the tax on all petroleum products generates slightly less horizontal inequity than the specific tax on gasoline. This suggests that broadly based fuel taxes are likely to encounter less opposition than taxes on particular fuels, unless, like diesel oil, they are used almost entirely as intermediate inputs into the production of other goods and services.
V. GENERALIZATIONS OF THE MODEL
All models designed for the analysis of policy choices rest upon a number of more or less drastic simplifying assumptions, so before discussing the implica- tions of the findings reported above it will be useful to -consider the robustness of the results to changes in some of these assumptions. Details of the more elaborate models which underpin this discussion are given in Hughes (1986c) . Here I focus upon two important aspects of the models, substitution effects and income effects.
Substitution Effects
In estimating both the price and welfare effects of the taxes, the model does not allow for substitution between inputs in production or between goods and services in consumption. This is appropriate for a short-run analysis of small tax changes, but, as I have emphasized above, it leads to an overestimation of the longer-term impact of the taxes, especially when a substantial shift in the relative prices of competing goods is involved-for example, the specific fuel taxes. For the import and export sales taxes, the substitution effects are quite small and need not be of concern. Taxes on fuels involve two types of substitution: between some kind of composite energy input and other composite inputs such as materials and labor; and between fuels within the energy composite. It seems that the first type of substitution is more important in determining the overall effect of fuel taxes on producer and consumer price indexes. Allowing for both kinds of substitution reduces the predicted increases in the consumer price index that result from the tax on all petroleum products and the excises on gasoline and diesel oil by between 20 and 30 percent of their values without substitution. For the kerosene tax, the proportionate reduction is less than 10 percent. It should be remembered, however, that with substitution, the tax rates calculated above will no longer generate equal net revenue because the tax-induced substitution effects imply substantial shifts in total demand for different fuels, which are subject to varying taxes or subsidies. It is more difficult to estimate the implications of substitution in household consumption because it has proved difficult to derive plausible price elasticities for consumer demand. The impact of substitution in production alone reduces the median expenditure transfers and their dispersion by between 30 and 50 percent for the taxes on all petroleum products, gasoline, and diesel oil but does not alter conclusions about their impact on inequality. Substitution in consumption might be expected to reduce the median expenditure transfers even further and to lower the progressivity of the taxes on all petroleum products and on gasoline. Production substitution has only a limited effect in reducing the expenditure transfers caused by the kerosene excise, but substitution in consumption should substantially reduce both the median expenditure transfer and the regressivity of this tax.
Income Effects
In sections II and IV, it was emphasized that the difference between the costplus pricing model and the general pricing model adopted in this study lies in the assumption that the incidence of taxes on intermediate goods is fully shifted forward under cost-plus pricing, whereas the general pricing model allows for the possibility of backward shifting onto incomes as a result of competition from traded goods. Thus, income effects may be important in assessing the impact of particular taxes when there are significant differences between the price increases predicted by the two models. Unfortunately, it is usually quite difficult to trace changes in sector profit rates through to income changes for households in a household budget survey. The Thai Socio-Economic Surveys provide an exceptionally rich set of data on sources of household income, so an attempt was made to estimate the impact of the tax changes on entrepreneurial and selfemployment incomes.
It was assumed that profits and earnings from self-employment are a residual after the cost of material inputs, hired labor, and taxes have been met-as implied by equation 10. On this basis, the proportional change in such income for each sector was calculated from the pricing model and this was applied, to the extent allowed by the detail on sources of income in the surveys, to estimate the income change experienced by each household. This estimation of what I shall call the "income transfer" was reasonably satisfactory for agricultural income but less so for profits and similar income from industrial and service activities. The "net transfer" generated by a particular tax is then simply the sum of the expenditure and income transfers. These were analyzed in the same way as the expenditure transfers. Both median and average net transfers for each tax were larger than the equivalent values for the expenditure transfer, but the changes were small for the fuel taxes and the import sales tax. For the export sales tax, the distribution of net transfers is completely different from the distribution of expenditure transfers, as one would expect, since it is known that the tax is more than fully shifted back onto producers' incomes. The median net transfer is still negative, but the average net transfer is positive, and the dispersion of the net transfer is extremely high. The export sales tax is seen to be quite regressive on the basis of the net transfers according to the progressivity index, though it has little effect on vertical inequality as measured by the welfare index. Use of the net transfers enhances the distributional benefits associated with the fuel taxes and reduces the regressive impact of the kerosene excise. Overall, the income transfers tend to reinforce conclusions based on the expenditure transfers for the fuel taxes, whereas for the export tax they offset the expenditure transfers so that the net impact of the tax is both difficult to assess and very variable according to the circumstances of each household.
One other type of income effect is the feedback from aggregate demand to wage levels referred to in equation 12. In the spirit of investigating structural adjustment, I have examined the implications of assuming that nominal wage rates decline by 1 percent when various of the general taxes are imposed. Naturally, this reduces the impact of the taxes on the general price level and thus the size of the typical expenditure transfer. It has little effect on the distributional impact of the taxes, even when the decline in nominal wages is taken into account when calculating the income transfers experienced by households.
These investigations suggest that the general character of the conclusions in sections III and IV concerning the fuel taxes are not affected by relaxing some of the major assumptions of the model. Inevitably, the magnitude of price changes and the distribution of real income transfers are altered, but most of the variations are readily understood and they do not affect the basic picture. For the export sales tax, the income effects are substantial and vwould cause one to revise one's views concerning the desirability of the tax quite radically. This is not surprising given the pattern of price and profit changes discussed in section III, but it is a useful reminder of the need for care in choosing taxes to be analyzed with the aid of the main model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have outlined an approach which enables one to analyze the incidence of indirect taxes imposed upon intermediate as well as final goods. Because of the difficulties involved in collecting the requisite information on tax rates and price elasticities, I have not tried to calculate welfare measures indicating whether particular taxes should be increased or decreased. Instead, the discussion of the incidence of the taxes has, in effect, extended the descriptive approach adopted in standard tax analysis by examining the impact of the taxes on the distribution of real income for large samples of households. This procedure can be implemented with relatively limited resources and can be easily updated as better information becomes available. At the same time, it can be made the starting point for a more thorough welfare analysis or it can be used to answer specific questions concerning the impact of proposed reforms on particular groups of the population.
The adoption of a pricing model which is more general than the conventional cost-plus pricing rule has a substantial effect on the results of the analysis, because it leads to a lower overall increase in both producer and consumer price indexes and to a rather different pattern of relative price changes. Furthermore, the divergence from cost-plus pricing means that the incidence of the taxes is shifted backward onto factor incomes to a significant extent. A separate analysis of the incidence of the tax reforms on net real incomes suggests that the changes in factor incomes can have a significant effect on conclusions about the impact of certain tax changes on the distribution of real income. 'The inclusion of changes in factor incomes in the analysis did not alter any of the main conclusions about the impact of the fuel taxes examined in this article. Conversely, the income changes associated with an export sales tax were large but very erratic in their distribution across households so that the index of horizontal inequity for the tax was greatly increased.
By focusing specifically on fuel taxes, this article has shown that the effect of such taxes on price indexes is small and that, for example, a reduction in taxes on imports offset by the imposition of an equivalent tax on all petroleum products would leave the consumer price index essentially unchanged and would tend to improve the overall distribution of income. In present circumstances, the significance of these results is that the Thai government could choose to take advantage of the fall in the world price of oil to hold domestic prices for petroleum products constant, that is, to increase taxes on petroleum products and use the revenue to reduce import duties. This would not affect the decline in the underlying rate of inflation, but it would improve the distribution of income slightly and would confer long-term efficiency benefits by reducing effective rates of protection and discrimination against export-oriented sectors. Going one step further, the government could use the revenue from higher fuel taxes to reduce both import duties and export taxes. The fall in inflation would be less, since lower export taxes tend to push up domestic prices, but the benefits resulting from a less distorted set of incentives for producers and exporters would be greater. Of course, those employed in import-substituting sectors would find such changes unpalatable, but a period of falling world oil prices provides an especially favorable environment for moving away from a policy of increasing protectionism.
On distributional grounds, the major objection to fuel taxes arises from the adverse impact of a tax on kerosene. Unfortunately, there are very powerful efficiency arguments for not discriminating between kerosene and diesel oil in setting taxes and, in the longer run, a large discrepancy between taxes on gasoline and diesel oil leads to substitution away from gasoline in transport. Hence, distributional considerations apart, there are good a priori reasons for preferring a tax system which imposes similar tax rates on all petroleum products or on all fuels. Such taxes would improve the overall vertical inequality of the distribution of real income. The broader the tax base, the less would be the horizontal inequity arising because of its differential impact on households with similar total expenditure levels. An alternative approach might be to find a tax or subsidy which could be used to offset the effects of kerosene taxation on poorer (especially rural) households, but in practice it is very difficult to identify a suitable commodity or group of commodities. Any combination of commodity subsidies designed to offset the overall distributional impact of taxing kerosene would generate substantial horizontal effects-that is, there would be a redistribution of real income between households at similar initial levels of income per person.
Between 1975 and 1982, the Thai government substantially reduced the price of kerosene relative to diesel oil and other petroleum products. As a result, consumption rose rapidly among nonhousehold users, so that by 1981-82 the kerosene excise was much less regressive than in 1975-76. This implies that the distributional benefits of a kerosene subsidy on its own are likely to be rapidly eroded because of substitution away from other fuels in favor of kerosene. Since this substitution would primarily be away from diesel oil, it might then be argued that both fuels should be subsidized equally. In that case, more than 90 percent of the subsidy would be devoted to diesel oil, so that the net distributional and inflationary benefits of the subsidy would be very small. It is this combination of easy substitution between kerosene and diesel oil in industrial and other uses and the dominance of diesel oil-for which taxes or subsidies are effectively neutral in distributional terms-over kerosene in total consumption which ensures that a policy of redistribution via fuel subsidies would almost certainly prove to be an expensive failure.
Overall, the analysis of fuel taxes may be interpreted in two contrasting ways:
* It can be argued that there is no real basis for using fuel taxes as a method of achieving other social or economic objectives, so that they should be set to achieve efficiency in the use of different sources of energy in the major energy-consuming sectors, such as transport. * The second interpretation concentrates on the finding that a general tax on petroleum products has a very limited impact on the economy as a whole. It may thus be seen as a desirable method of raising government revenue.
The choice between these two interpretations depends on the weight given to government revenue relative to the efficiency losses associated with higher fuel prices and taxes. 
